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APPLYING THE COMMON INTEREST DOCTRINE TO
THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING
ABSTRACT
Third-party litigation funding is an emerging industry that provides financial
backing to plaintiffs. Typically, third-party litigation funders provide money in
exchange for a percentage of damage returns. If the plaintiff’s claim fails, then
the third-party litigation funder loses its investment.
To decide whether a given plaintiff’s claim is a good investment, the thirdparty litigation funder assesses the claim’s merits by conducting due diligence
over a large swath of documents. Often, these documents are protected by
attorney–client privilege. Under normal waiver rules for attorney–client
privilege, when privileged documents are disclosed to a third party, the privilege
holder impliedly waives the privilege protection.
As an exemption from normal waiver rules for attorney–client privilege, the
common interest doctrine has developed, preventing a waiver when a disclosure
is made to a third party sharing a common legal interest with the privilege
holder. Courts vary in their approaches to defining what constitutes a common
legal interest, but typically the third-party litigation funder’s commercial
interest in a lawsuit is insufficient.
Although superficially this may appear a legitimate result (as the funders
invest in a lawsuit without providing any direct legal assistance), it is largely
incongruent with how courts apply the common interest doctrine for insurers
and re-insurers. Most courts find that insurers of defendants (and re-insurers of
insurers defending claims) have sufficiently common legal interests with
privilege holders to invoke the common interest exemption from normal waiver
rules.
In these insurance situations, sharing liability—to the extent that it
constitutes a collaborative effort towards a joint defense of a claim—is sufficient
to indicate a common legal interest. These insurers allow defendants to share
the inherent risks with their lawsuits.
Consequently, third-party litigation funders deserve the same protection
(afforded to insurers and re-insurers) offered by the common interest doctrine.
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Recognizing the common interest doctrine to protect documents disclosed to
insurers and third-party litigation funders effectuates the policy goal of
attorney–client privilege; it enables litigants to most effectively obtain legal
counsel.
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INTRODUCTION
Although third-party litigation funding has only recently gained traction in
the United States, the idea of a party not directly involved in a given lawsuit
providing capital to fund that lawsuit is not a modern business concept.1
Previously, courts used the terms “maintenance” and “champerty” to describe

1 Carol Langford, Betting on the Client: Alternative Litigation Funding Is an Ethically Risky Proposition
for Attorneys and Clients, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. 237, 237 (2015).
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various business arrangements where a party not directly involved in a suit
contributed funds to one of the litigants.2
Tracing its origins to these historical antecedents, third-party litigation
funding, in its modern form, originated in the 1990s in Australia.3 Following its
start in Australia, third-party litigation funding has quickly emerged in the
United States as an attractive investment option.4
What initiated as loan arrangements for primarily small lawsuits has grown
into an industry focused on complex investment deals involving millions of
dollars.5 Whereas the original model for third-party litigation funding provided
small amounts of money through nonrecourse loans, the predominant
mechanism is now to fund lawsuits in exchange for a share of the plaintiff’s
recovery.6
A number of diverse players have entered the industry. Primarily, these
include hedge funds and private equity firms seeking to diversify their
portfolios,7 high net worth individuals looking for a new investment
opportunity,8 and companies whose primary business focus is investing in
lawsuits.9
The industry attracts investors because the rate of return on investments is
correlated with neither the performance of the stock market nor the health of the

2 See Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 68–70 (2011). Historically, courts
found it troubling that a party not actually involved with the suit could be the driving force behind the litigation.
Id.
3 Geoffrey J. Lysaught & D. Scott Hazelgrove, Economic Implications of Third-Party Litigation
Financing on the U.S. Civil Justice System, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 645, 648 (2012).
4 Id. at 649.
5 Holly E. Loiseau, Eric C. Lyttle & Brianna N. Benfield, Third-Party Financing of Commercial
Litigation, IN-HOUSE LITIGATOR, Summer 2010, at 1, 7.
6 Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus Reality in Third-Party Litigation Financing, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y
593, 594 (2012).
7 Loiseau, Lyttle & Benfield, supra note 5, at 7; see also Paul M. Barrett, Back a Lawsuit, Get a Return:
Investors Back Plaintiffs and Get a Share of the Proceeds in Return, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 12, 2012,
9:04 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-01-12/back-a-lawsuit-get-a-return; Catherine Ho,
Investment Firms Playing Role in Legal Field, WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/capitalbusiness/investment-firms-playing-role-in-legal-field/2011/12/05/gIQAurh7nO_story.html?
utm_term=.a6da8ae00fdb.
8 Loiseau, Lyttle & Benfield, supra note 5, at 7.
9 See STEVEN GARBER, ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS,
AND UNKNOWNS 13–15 (2010), http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP306.html.

SCHACKNOW GALLEYPROOFS2

1464

6/14/2017 2:21 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:1461

economy.10 The merits of a company’s potential legal claim, for example, have
nothing to do with its stock price.
Some estimates suggest that investors in the U.S. third-party litigation
funding market currently contribute upwards of $1 billion directly to plaintiffs’
firms,11 and the potential market is close to $33 billion.12 Moreover, the nature
of the jury trial and the consequent possibility of enormous damage awards
creates the potential for third-party litigation funders to realize huge returns on
their investments.13 In some lawsuits, the availability of punitive and treble
damages makes investing even more attractive to prospective third-party
litigation funders.14
However attractive the upside, investing in a lawsuit is not without risk. To
mitigate risk, prospective third-party litigation funders conduct due diligence
over large portions of information related to a case.15 Part of this due diligence
process involves the plaintiff preparing documents for the third-party litigation
funder and informing the third-party litigation funder about the case’s merits.16
Often, case information conveyed to the third-party litigation funder is
privileged.17 After assessing the risk18 of a particular lawsuit, the third-party
litigation funders adjust the percentage of damages they receive from an
investment.19 In some instances, third-party litigation funders draw up

10 See Lysaught & Hazelgrove, supra note 3, at 650. Non-correlated assets change in value irrespective of
the traditional stock and bond markets. See generally Income Surfer, The Importance of Non-Correlated Assets,
SEEKING ALPHA (Apr. 17, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/2147853-the-importance-of-noncorrelated-assets. Some investors opt for non-correlated assets to diversify a portfolio and see gains even when
traditional markets are performing poorly. Id.
11 Kirby Griffis, Follow the Money: Litigation Funders Back Your Foes, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS.,
July 2011, at 1, 6, http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2011/July/01.pdf.
12 Lysaught & Hazelgrove, supra note 3, at 650.
13 Shepherd, supra note 6, at 600.
14 Id.
15 Ani-Rae Lovell, Protecting Privilege: How Alternative Litigation Finance Supports an Attorney’s Role,
28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 703, 705–06 (2015).
16 See Michele DeStefano, Claim Funders and Commercial Claim Holders: A Common Interest or a
Common Problem?, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 328 & n.102 (2014) (describing the process by which third-party
funders analyze claims to determine the likelihood of success).
17 Id. at 327–28, 327 nn.98–99.
18 Id. at 313 (describing how third-party funders consider both the estimated time until a case is decided
and the monetary value of the claim).
19 Id. (suggesting that the percentage of damage awards received by a third-party litigation funder can be
anywhere from 20% to 50%).
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arrangements providing that they receive the first portion of any damages
awarded.20
The industry’s emergence has drawn polarizing reactions.21 Some
commentators denounce the industry as a vehicle for funding frivolous
lawsuits22 that needlessly extends the length of litigation.23 Proponents of the
industry respond that they are incentivized to fund meritorious claims,24 claims
which are too costly for a plaintiff to litigate without additional funding.25 These
investors allow cash-strapped plaintiffs to share the risk inherent with any
lawsuit.26
Rather than adding to the vast commentary on the relative merits and
shortcomings of third-party litigation funding, this Comment analyzes novel
concerns appearing before courts arising from the emergence of this industry.
Specifically, courts are wrestling with whether information plaintiffs share with
prospective funders, as a part of the funders’ due diligence, is protected by either
attorney–client privilege or work-product privilege.27
This Comment examines two central issues regarding information shared
with third-party litigation funders. First, it considers whether material prepared
by a plaintiff for review by third-party litigation funders is protected by
20 Joanna M. Shepherd & Judd E. Stone II, Economic Conundrums in Search of a Solution: The Functions
of Third-Party Litigation Finance, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 919, 941–42 (2015); see also Maya Steinitz, The Litigation
Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 467–71 (2012).
21 Shepherd, supra note 6, at 596–601.
22 JOHN BEISNER, JESSICA MILLER & GARY RUBIN, SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY
LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 5–6 (2009), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/
thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf. Third-party litigation funders often provide capital to highly speculative
lawsuits that present the opportunity for large awards. Id. Pursuing meritorious claims is not always their best
investment strategy. Id. at 6; see also Shepherd, supra note 6, at 600 (discussing how third-party litigation
funders “have little incentive to finance cases where plaintiffs face significant barriers to justice”). The
opportunities for third-party funders to realize their largest returns comes in cases where the underlying laws
create risk and cost imbalances favoring plaintiffs. Id. at 601.
23 BEISNER, MILLER & RUBIN, supra note 22, at 6.
24 See Lauren J. Grous, Note, Causes of Action for Sale: The New Trend of Legal Gambling, 61 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 203, 206 (2006) (stating that plaintiffs may lack finances and be unable to pursue meritorious claims).
25 Id. at 204–06.
26 Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65,
72–73 (2010) (describing how funders permit plaintiffs to hedge their bet).
27 See, e.g., Doe v. Soc’y of Missionaries of Sacred Heart, No. 11-cv-02518, 2014 WL 1715376 (N.D. Ill.
May 1, 2014); Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Mondis Tech., Ltd. v. LG
Elecs., Inc., Nos. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE, 2:08-CV-478-TJW, 2011 WL 1714304 (E.D. Tex. May 4, 2011);
Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373 (D. Del. 2010); Charge Injection Techs., Inc. v. E.I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co., No. 07C-12-134-JRJ (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2015); Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. v.
Moonmouth Co., No. 7841-VCP, 2015 WL 778846 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2015).
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attorney–client privilege. If so, this Comment seeks to answer whether
disclosure to a third-party litigation funder constitutes waiver of privilege, or the
disclosure is exempt from waiver because of the “common interest doctrine.”
Second, and notwithstanding the attorney–client privilege question, this
Comment considers whether material prepared by the plaintiff for review by
third-party litigation funders is protected by work-product privilege. If so, it
considers whether disclosure to a third-party litigation funder constitutes waiver
of work-product privilege.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Before addressing the questions of
attorney–client privilege and work-product privilege, this Comment provides
some background information on both. After laying that foundation, this
Comment surveys caselaw surrounding issues of privilege and waiver in the
context of third-party litigation funding. This discussion is timely, as the
Supreme Court has yet to address the issue, and different jurisdictions have
varied approaches.28 To resolve the jurisdictional splits, this Comment examines
legal arguments from the insurance industry. By considering third-party
litigation funding as a plaintiff’s equivalent to what insurers provide for
defendants, it will be easier to get away from ideological criticisms of third-party
litigation funders. This Comment seeks to answer legal questions about the
applicability of work-product privilege and attorney–client privilege and does
not make partisan policy arguments either supporting or criticizing the thirdparty litigation funding industry.
Ultimately, this Comment explains why recognizing attorney–client
privilege and work-product privilege for information plaintiffs share with thirdparty litigation funders protects clients’ interests while promoting the adversarial
nature of the American judicial system. This Comment concludes that, from a
public policy perspective, both attorney–client privilege and work-product
privilege—along with their related exemptions from implied waivers—should
be construed broadly in the context of third-party litigation funding.

28

See infra Parts II, III.
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I. DEFINING ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK-PRODUCT PRIVILEGE
A. Attorney–Client Privilege
Attorney–client privilege derives from the English common law.29 Although
it has undergone various transformations since its early days, attorney–client
privilege in the United States today is meant to encourage people to seek legal
advice within the safe confines of confidentiality.30 By creating an environment
where clients may freely share even potentially damaging facts with their
attorneys, clients receive higher quality legal advice because their attorney is
fully aware of all the facts surrounding their case.31 In short, attorney–client
privilege facilitates the effective rendering of legal counsel.
Operationally, attorney–client privilege protects communications, oral or
written, made between an attorney and a client, from having to be divulged in a
court proceeding or during discovery.32 The client may waive the privilege either
voluntarily or by disclosing the information to a third party in a manner
inconsistent with keeping it confidential.33
Although ordinarily disclosure of privileged information to a third party
impliedly waives the privilege, courts recognize a variety of related exemptions
to maintain attorney–client privilege even when a disclosure is made.34 Courts
are not always consistent in how they identify these exemptions, at times using
different names depending on the jurisdiction and the situation before the
court.35 For clarity’s sake, when dealing with any type of exemption from the
29 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290, at 542 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961). But see Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF.
L. REV. 487, 487–88 (1928) (suggesting that attorney–client privilege’s lineage goes back even further to Roman
times when slaves could not testify against their master and advocates could not testify against their clients).
30 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (“The purpose of the [attorney–client] privilege is
to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys.”).
31 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); see also Lluberes v. Uncommon Prods., 663
F.3d 6, 23 (1st Cir. 2011) (“By safeguarding communications between attorney and client, the privilege
encourages disclosures that facilitate the client’s compliance with law and better enable him to present legitimate
arguments when litigation arises.”).
32 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358–59 (D. Mass. 1950) (“The rule . . .
allows a client to prevent the disclosure of information which he gave to his attorney for the purpose of securing
legal assistance . . . .” ).
33 81 AM. JURIS. 2D § 348 (2016); see also Nguyen v. Excel Corp., 197 F.3d 200, 207 (5th Cir. 1999)
(“When relayed to a third party that is not rendering legal services on the client’s behalf, a communication is no
longer confidential, and thus it falls outside of the reaches of the privilege.”).
34 See Katharine Traylor Schaffzin, An Uncertain Privilege: Why the Common Interest Doctrine Does Not
Work and How Uniformity Can Fix It, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 49, 55 n.14 (2004).
35 Id. (collecting cases).
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normal waiver rules for attorney–client privilege (involving parties with similar
interests), this Comment refers to it as the “common interest doctrine.”
B. Common Interest Doctrine
Courts typically define the common interest doctrine as an exemption from
normal waiver rules that apply when a third party to whom privileged
information is disclosed shares a common legal interest with the party that made
the disclosure.36 Although it is tempting to construe the common interest
doctrine as an extension of attorney–client privilege,37 a more precise definition
characterizes it as an exemption from normal waiver rules.38 On the one hand,
recognizing the common interest doctrine as an extension of an already-existing
privilege indicates that third-party receivers of confidential information warrant
having a privilege.39 Conversely, characterizing the common interest doctrine as
an exemption constrains the privilege to exist between the attorney and the client
(but not the third party).40
The linguistic debate may appear merely semantic, but it has practical
consequences. Once courts start broadening attorney–client privilege, the
floodgates open and the privilege may become overly expansive.
However, properly characterizing the common interest doctrine as an
exemption means that third parties sharing a common legal interest with a
litigant are not themselves entitled to a privilege; rather, an already-existing
privilege is not waived if privileged information is shared with a party sharing a
common legal interest. It is a fine distinction, but an important one nonetheless.
C. Work-Product Privilege
While attorney–client privilege protects communications between an
attorney and a client,41 work-product privilege protects materials prepared for

36

United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243–44 (2d Cir. 1989).
See Schaffzin, supra note 34, at 54 n.12 (collecting cases).
38 See id. at 55 n.13 (collecting cases).
39 See id. at 68 (discussing how a major criticism of the common interest doctrine is that it broadens the
attorney–client privilege’s applicability). Understanding the common interest doctrine to be an exemption for
material already having an underlying privilege means that it does not broaden attorney–client privilege. See id.
40 See id.
41 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358–59 (D. Mass. 1950) (discussing when
attorney–client privilege applies).
37
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pending litigation.42 In deciding whether material deserves protection from
work-product privilege, courts ask if the material was prepared in anticipation
of litigation.43
As with attorney–client privilege, a client can impliedly waive work-product
privilege by disclosing the material to a third party.44 But a disclosure to a thirdparty of material entitled to work-product privilege does not automatically waive
the privilege.45 This is because work-product privilege gives broader protection
to information than attorney–client privilege.46 A party waives work-product
privilege if a disclosure is inconsistent with the adversarial process.47 A
disclosure is inconsistent with the adversarial process when it substantially
increases the likelihood of the material becoming available to an adversary.48
II. SURVEY OF CASELAW SURROUNDING PRIVILEGE PROBLEMS FOR THIRDPARTY LITIGATION FUNDERS
This Part discusses the few federal district court cases that have addressed
the waiver issue (along with the related common interest exemption) when
privileged information is disclosed to third-party litigation funders. Considering
that no appellate court has yet to take up the issue, this discussion is timely. After
sketching the current lay of the land for the third-party litigation funders, this
Comment turns to the insurance industry. This necessary groundwork will set
up an analysis of the disparate treatments of waiver and privilege as applied to
third-party litigation funders and insurers. By analogizing third-party litigation
funders to insurers, it is clear that each is deserving of similar protections.

42 Binks Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Presto Indus., 709 F.2d 1109, 1118 (7th Cir. 1983); see also FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(3).
43 Nat’l Presto Indus., 709 F.2d at 1118; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). Just because litigation eventually
results does not necessarily mean material created prior to the lawsuit deserves work-product privilege. Rather,
only if it was prepared because of pending litigation does it receive work-product privilege. Nat’l Presto Indus.,
709 F.2d at 1118.
44 Appleton Papers, Inc. v. EPA, 702 F.3d 1018, 1025 (7th Cir. 2012).
45 See id.
46 Id. at 1024.
47 Id. at 1024–25.
48 Id. at 1025 (holding that disclosure waives work-product privilege if it “substantially increase[s] the
opportunities for potential adversaries to obtain the information” (quoting 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2024 (2012))).
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The preeminent case,49 Miller v. Caterpillar,50 provides a comprehensive
analysis of the privilege and waiver problems for third-party litigation funders.51
As no other federal case has analyzed the common interest doctrine as applied
to third-party litigation funding in such detail, this Comment pays considerable
attention to the case.
In 2014, the plaintiff in Caterpillar sued alleging misappropriation of trade
secrets.52 The plaintiff contended that the defendant opted for a drawn out
discovery process as a litigation tactic to drive up the cost of the lawsuit and
thereby outlast the plaintiff.53
Consequently, to finance its claim, the plaintiff sought out several third-party
litigation funders before finally reaching an agreement with one of them.54 The
defendant contended that any financing agreement is illegal under a theory of
maintenance55 and sought discovery of the actual contract with the plaintiff’s
third-party litigation funder56 as well as all the proposed agreements with the
third-party litigation funders that the plaintiff had previously sought. The
plaintiff responded that the funding contract itself is irrelevant and that any
information that was provided to the third-party litigation funder is protected by
either work-product privilege or attorney–client privilege.57 Additionally, the
plaintiff argued that disclosure to the third-party litigation funder did not waive
privilege.58 The defendant took an opposing view, arguing that any information
about the case provided to a funder is not protected, and even if it was, disclosure
of such information would thereby waive the privilege.59

49 See Disclosure of Documents in Litigation Finance, BENTHAM IMF (Aug. 2016), http://www.
benthamimf.com/what-we-do/disclosure-of-documents-in-litigation-finance (stating that Miller v. Caterpillar
reflects “the current state of the law”).
50 17 F. Supp. 3d 711 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
51 Disclosure of Documents in Litigation Finance, supra note 49.
52 Caterpillar, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 717.
53 Id. at 718 (stating that even if defendant does not intentionally employ a “scorched earth policy” of
cumbersome discovery, the general costs of litigation can make it difficult for certain plaintiffs to maintain a
suit). The Caterpillar court expressly links the existence of “protracted discovery” as a reason for the rise of
third-party litigation funding. Id.
54 Id. at 719.
55 Id.; see also Sebok, supra note 2, at 70–74 (discussing courts’ historical treatment of “maintenance” and
“champerty”).
56 Caterpillar, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 719.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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The court first addressed two of the defendant’s arguments about documents
detailing the actual funding arrangement. For the first of these preliminary
issues, the court explored whether the funding agreement was relevant and
therefore discoverable.60 The court agreed with the plaintiff that the deal
document, which outlined the contract agreement between the plaintiff and its
funder, was not relevant because it had nothing to do with the claims or defenses
in the case.61
Easily dispatching of the relevancy issue, the court next addressed whether
the documents were discoverable as to show the real party in interest to the suit.62
The court held that though it is true that a case must be litigated in the name of
the real party in interest,63 the real party in interest is defined as the holder of the
substantive legal claim.64 For the court, all that existed between the plaintiff and
the third-party litigation funder was a contractual relationship outlining the
exchange of legal funding for a portion of potential damage returns.65 Nothing
about the funding contract suggested that the right to prosecute the legal claim
transferred from the plaintiff to the third-party litigation funder.66
Having disposed of these preliminary issues, the court set the stage to analyze
both what kinds of privileges exist for information given to third-party litigation
funders and how those privileges may be impliedly waived. The court’s inquiry
concerned the discoverability of the information contained within the “non-deal
documents.”67 As the name suggests, the “non-deal documents” contained
information regarding the merits of the case, not the particulars of the contract
between the plaintiff and the third-party litigation funder.68 The court divided its
analysis into two parts: (1) attorney–client privilege and (2) work-product

60

Id. at 721; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
Caterpillar, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 728.
62 Id. This issue is of some interest because the defendant maintained that the plaintiff’s litigation financing
arrangement is akin to subrogation in the insurance context. Id. Interestingly, courts often construe the common
interest exemption to exist for insurers of defendants. See infra Part III. For the defendant here to liken the two
industries could possibly do the defendant a disservice to its later contention about any privilege being waived
by a disclosure.
63 Caterpillar, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 728.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 728–30.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 730 (stating that this information very well may be relevant and would be otherwise discoverable).
The issue is that even if it is relevant, it might still be barred from discovery because it is privileged. Id.
68 Id. at 719 (describing the assertions of the parties where Miller says it has “produced any all documents
that contain admissions or statements regarding the merits of the claims or defenses”).
61
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privilege, and the court recognized that the existence of either privilege shields
the plaintiff.69 This Comment addresses each part in turn.
A. Attorney–Client Privilege and Common Interest Doctrine
The court in Caterpillar began its privilege analysis by noting that
documents prepared for business purposes alone are not entitled to protection by
attorney–client privilege.70 However, legal advice related to business purposes
would be protected by attorney–client privilege.71 The court characterized
information given to third-party litigation funders for the purpose of investing
in a lawsuit as not confidential72 because the “contemplated funding transaction
was merely commercial or financial.”73 The court recognized that even the
plaintiff contended that the relationship with its funders is nothing beyond one
party financing another.74 Relying on other courts’ understandings of attorney–
client privilege,75 the Caterpillar court suggested that information transmitted
from a client to its attorney for the purpose of eventually reaching a third party
that is not protected by privilege is not confidential and does not obtain attorney–
client privilege.76 Hence, the information provided by the plaintiff for a thirdparty litigation funder is not entitled to attorney–client privilege.77
However, even though the court suggested that the “non-deal documents”
are not protected by attorney–client privilege, the court seemed intent on
addressing the question concerning waiver.78 If the court had decided that the
information was not protected by attorney–client privilege, then it could not
inquire about applicability of the common interest doctrine. Thus, for the sake
of argument, the court assumed that the plaintiff had satisfied its burden of
showing that the information is protected by attorney–client privilege.79
69

See id. at 731, 734.
Id. at 730.
71 Id. (noting that “legal advice relating to business matters clearly does” receive attorney–client privilege
(quoting Sullivan v. Alcatel–Lucent USA, Inc., No. 12 CV 7528, 2013 WL 2637936, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 12,
2013))).
72 Id. at 730.
73 Id. at 731.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 730; see also United States v. Schussel, 291 F. App’x 336, 347 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v.
Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1983).
76 Caterpillar, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 730.
77 Id. at 731.
78 Id.
79 Id. (“Although [the defendant] has the better of the argument, we shall assume, arguendo, that Miller
has sustained its burden of showing that the materials it provided to its lawyers for further submission to
prospective funders were protected by the attorney–client privilege and proceed to the question of waiver.”).
70
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Importantly, the court actively tried to address both the question of waiver
and whether the common interest doctrine should apply.80 The court did not
gloss over these issues; rather, it made a concerted effort to address them.81
Consequently, as the court gave the common interest doctrine its full attention,
its analysis is all the more pertinent to this Comment’s discussion.
The court outlined the policy behind the attorney–client privilege, stressing
that its purpose is to encourage complete disclosure to a party’s legal counsel
with the assurance of confidentiality.82 As a result, a “disclosure to a third party
that eliminates that confidentiality constitutes a waiver of the privilege.”83 The
court noted that there is a split among the various jurisdictions regarding what
constitutes a sufficient “common legal interest,”84 and the crux of this Comment
analyzes this split. For the Caterpillar court, having a “rooting interest” in the
outcome of a lawsuit (as a third-party litigation funder has when investing in a
plaintiff’s case) is distinguishable from having a common legal interest.85 The
court argued that sharing a common legal interest means that parties actively
plan litigation strategy together.86 Using this definition, the court concluded that
the third-party litigation funder at issue had no involvement with the strategy of
the case.87 The third-party litigation funder, although monetarily invested in the
case, rooted from the sideline without providing any direct legal advice.88 Hence,
any non-deal documents protected by attorney–client privilege lost protection
when the contents were disclosed to the third-party litigation funder.89
Consider, though, how the court’s reasoning undermines the policy goals of
attorney–client privilege. By holding that the common interest doctrine does not
apply, the court makes poorly capitalized plaintiffs wary of reaching out to thirdparty litigation funders. Effectively, this hinders this class’s ability to obtain
counsel.
In technical terms, if information protected by attorney–client privilege is
disclosed to the very party for whom it was created—a party whose financing
permits a litigant to afford counsel—then it is misguided to conclude that such
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

See id. (describing waiver and its relation to the common interest doctrine).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 732.
Id.
Id. at 732–33.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 734.
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a disclosure could impliedly waive attorney–client privilege (a privilege
intended to allow a litigant to obtain effective counseling). Simply, the purpose
of the plaintiff making the disclosure, effective rendering of counsel, is the same
purpose underscoring attorney–client privilege.
The court assumed that the “materials [the plaintiff] provided to its lawyers
for further submission to prospective funders were protected by the attorney–
client privilege,”90 so that it could reach the question of waiver.91 If a court
makes this assumption, then it is inconsistent to effectively undermine the policy
of attorney–client privilege by suggesting that disclosing the information to the
party intended to receive it (the party whose financing enables the lawsuit to go
forward) should constitute a waiver of privilege.
The question really hinges on who receives the disclosure. If information is
disclosed to a party other than the one for whom the information is created, or if
it is disclosed to a party adverse or neutral to a lawsuit, then it follows that such
a disclosure does nothing to encourage the policy goals of attorney–client
privilege. Such a disclosure is consistent with an implied waiver of attorney–
client privilege.
The Caterpillar court, however, could have countered that it was the
plaintiff’s attorney for whom the plaintiff directly gave the materials. The
attorney, then, turned the information over to the third-party litigation funder.
As such, while the material may have been prepared to eventually reach the
third-party litigation funder, it became privileged when created by the plaintiff
for direct transfer to the attorneys. Whether the privilege remains when
eventually reaching the third-party litigation funder, under this line of reasoning,
is the exact kind of question that an implied waiver by disclosure to a third party
is meant to address.
This response does not adequately emphasize the fact that the attorney is
only an intermediary for the party’s true recipient. If the information is both
warranting protection by attorney–client privilege and created so as to inform a
third-party litigation funder about a case (a party whose very introduction into
the case is to allow a litigant to offset the legal expenses inherent with any
lawsuit), it would be a procedural faux pas to remove the material’s protection
because the material reached its intended destination. As the purpose of the

90
91

Id. at 731.
Id.
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attorney–client privilege is to encourage effective rendering of counsel,92
holding that the common interest doctrine does not apply when a plaintiff shares
information with a third-party litigation funder undermines the very privilege
which the common interest doctrine was developed to support.
B. Work-Product Privilege and Waiver
If the plaintiff cannot avail itself of the “common interest doctrine” with
respect to information protected by attorney–client privilege, might workproduct privilege provide an alternative protection? Information protected by
work-product privilege includes “the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other representative concerning the
litigation.”93 The plaintiff in Caterpillar contended that information given to
potential third-party litigation funders about attorneys’ mental impressions was
created “because of” the lawsuit and thus should be treated as protected work
product.94
The Caterpillar court noted a circuit split regarding the appropriate test for
assessing whether something is protected work-product.95 Along with the
plaintiff’s proposed “because of” test96 used by the Second Circuit, the court
references97 the Sixth Circuit’s test that asks whether the party invoking
privilege can show that the lawsuit was the “driving force behind the preparation
of each requested document.”98 Ultimately, the Caterpillar court adopted the
“because of” test, suggesting that to do otherwise threatens to undermine the
policy behind work-product privilege.99 Any other test does not adequately
assess whether a document was prepared in anticipation of litigation.100 Citing
Seventh Circuit precedent, the court stated that “the test should be whether, in
light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the particular case,
the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the
prospect of litigation.”101
92

United States v. Buckley, 585 F.2d 498, 502 (5th Cir. 1978).
Caterpillar, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 734 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B)).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. The defendant adopted this test from language used by the Second Circuit in United States v. Adlman,
134 F.3d 1194, 1199 (2d Cir. 1998).
97 Caterpillar, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 734.
98 In re Prof’ls Direct Ins., 578 F.3d 432, 439 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Roxworthy, 457
F.3d 590, 595 (6th Cir. 2006)).
99 Caterpillar, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 734–35.
100 Id. at 735.
101 Id. (quoting Binks Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Presto Indus., 709 F.2d 1109, 1119 (7th Cir. 1983)).
93
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The Caterpillar court wisely observed that any documents containing
theories and mental impressions created to analyze the merits of the case should
not per se lose work-product status because they may also have a dual purpose
of apprising funders of the legal scenario.102 The correct question is not if these
documents are protected work-product, but rather given that they are work
product, do they lose protected status by disclosure to potential funders?103
In answering the question, the court distinguished between attorney–client
privilege and work-product privilege: while materials protected by attorney–
client privilege lose their protection when a disclosure is made to third-party
litigation funder,104 the same is not necessarily true of information protected by
work-product privilege.105
The court made this distinction because of the two different policy goals
underlying each privilege.106 While attorney–client privilege protects
confidential communications between attorneys and clients, work-product
privilege is geared towards promoting the adversarial litigation system.107
Consequently, for attorney–client privilege, a party automatically waives
privilege if it makes a disclosure that is inconsistent with keeping
communications between an attorney and client confidential.108 For workproduct privilege, a waiver occurs if information is disclosed “in a manner that
‘substantially increase[s] the opportunity for potential adversaries to obtain the
information.’”109
Thus, the court’s inquiry regarding whether there was a waiver of materials
protected by work-product privilege centered on this adversarial risk.110 If a
party can show a disclosure to a third party did not make it substantially more
likely that the information would fall into the hands of the adversary, then no
waiver occurred.111

102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Id.
Id.
Id. at 731–33.
Id. at 735–36.
Id. at 736.
Id.
Id. at 731, 735.
Id. at 736 (quoting Appleton Papers, Inc. v. EPA, 702 F.3d 1018, 1025 (7th Cir. 2012)).
See id.
See id.
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The Caterpillar court noted that the plaintiff accounted for the risk of its
adversary obtaining privileged information by using confidentiality agreements
with potential third-party litigation funders.112 When discussing financing
arrangements without a written confidentiality agreement, the plaintiff made
sure orally that potential funders knew that shared information was to be kept
“strictly confidential.”113
With respect to these oral arrangements, so long as there was an offer for
shared information to be kept confidential and subsequent acceptance by a thirdparty litigation funder, the court treated the oral confidentiality arrangements the
same as written ones.114
For the Caterpillar court, showing the existence of confidentiality
agreements is sufficient to recognize non-waiver, but it is not necessary.115 The
court did not need to delve deeply into the issue here because the plaintiff did
not advance this argument,116 but the court suggested that the lack of a
confidentiality agreement would not necessarily be fatal for the issue of
waiver.117 For example, the court considered a potential argument suggesting
that because it would not be in the best interest of third-party litigation funders
to share privileged information with an investee’s adversary, then there is a
reasonable expectation of confidentiality when the funder receives privileged
information.118
Interestingly, on the one hand, when discussing work-product privilege, the
court suggested that it is reasonable to expect a third-party litigation funder
would keep information shared by the plaintiff confidential.119 But earlier, when
the court discussed attorney–client privilege, the court relied on the logic that if
a client transmits information to its attorney for the purposes of disclosing the

112

Id.
Id. (noting that the plaintiff’s assertion that oral agreements with the funder were understood to be
confidential could be characterized as a legal conclusion for the court to make, but because the defendant did
not raise this argument on its own, the argument is waived).
114 Id. at 737. It is worth noting that while the burden for attorney–client privilege is on the party asserting
privilege to show no waiver, the opposite is true for work-product privilege. Id. For work-product privilege, the
party asserting a waiver must affirmatively show its adversary took steps to make it more likely that confidential
information could become available to the party asserting waiver. Id.
115 Id. at 738.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 See id.
113
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information to a third party not protected by privilege, then the disclosure is
presumptively not confidential.120
The court does not address this incongruity, so it is impossible to know
exactly why a disclosure to a third-party litigation funder is not confidential in
the attorney–client privilege context but is for purposes of work-product
privilege. The court’s presumption of non-confidentiality in the attorney–client
privilege context is a bright line rule; it does not focus on the specifics of the
actual parties involved. On the other hand, for purposes of work-product
privilege, the court analyzes the actual plaintiff and third-party litigation funder
involved in the case to determine that a disclosure to a third party can be
confidential.121
Whereas the court’s discussion of confidentiality for purposes of attorney–
client privilege is blunt and rigid, its discussion of confidentiality for purposes
of work-product privilege is nuanced and intuitive. The attorney–client privilege
discussion of confidentiality serves as an adequate starting presumption. But
when a court has sufficient facts to know the likely intentions of the actual
parties involved (as it does in Caterpillar), the approach to confidentiality when
discussing work-product privilege better approximates the reality of a particular
case.
C. Takeaways from Caterpillar
The Caterpillar court’s analysis of the “common interest doctrine” for thirdparty litigation funding is the one issue from the case that most divides courts
around the country.122 Although Caterpillar exemplifies the majority approach,
a substantial minority of courts find that third-party litigation funders do have a
sufficiently common legal interest with plaintiff-investees to warrant applying
the common interest doctrine.123 These courts exempt plaintiffs from waiver of
privilege when they share information with third-party litigation funders.124
But even if most courts are unwilling to recognize the common interest
exemption from normal waiver rules for attorney–client privilege, litigants may
120

Id. at 730.
Supra notes 110–18 and accompanying text.
122 See infra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.
123 See, e.g., Fresenius Med. Care Holdings v. Roxane Labs., No. 2:05-CV-0889, 2007 WL 895059, at *1–
2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 21, 2007); Rembrandt Techs., L.P. v. Harris Corp., No. 07C-09-059-JRS, 2009 WL 402332,
at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2009).
124 See supra note 123.
121
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be tempted to think that work-product privilege is sufficient to protect their
confidential information. After all, a litigant need only avail itself of one
privilege.
True, the Caterpillar court’s discussion of work-product privilege for thirdparty litigation funders has much more consensus,125 but, hypothetically, a thirdparty litigation funder could make a request of documents that exceed what
would be protected under work-product privilege.126 For example, it is
foreseeable that a third-party litigation funder requests documents that go
beyond what an attorney would prepare in anticipation of litigation.127
The plaintiff could argue that any documents disclosed to a third-party
litigation funder necessarily are prepared in anticipation of litigation; the
plaintiff would never contact a third-party litigation funder unless anticipating
litigation. However, a wary court might hold that at least some document
requests go beyond what an attorney would generate in anticipation of litigation.
In such a scenario, the plaintiff could not avail itself of work-product
privilege to prevent discovery requests by the defendant. If the court does not
recognize the common interest doctrine as an exemption to disclosures to thirdparty litigation funders protected by attorney–client privilege, then the plaintiff
is out of luck.
D. Other Courts’ Understandings of Attorney–Client Privilege and Common
Interest Doctrine for Third-Party Litigation Funding
Some courts do not hold Caterpillar’s strict interpretation of what constitutes
a common legal interest between a litigant and third-party litigation funder.128
In a Delaware state court case, the court held that the agreement between a thirdparty litigation funder and a litigant “to enforce and exploit . . . patents through
litigation,” evidenced a sufficiently similar legal interest to apply the common
125 Several cases came after Caterpillar that support its treatment of work-product privilege. See, e.g., Doe
v. Soc’y of Missionaries of Sacred Heart, No. 11-CV-02518, 2014 WL 1715376, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2014);
Charge Injection Techs., Inc. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., No. 07C-12-134 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 31,
2015); Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. v. Moonmouth Co., No. 7841–VCP, 2015 WL 778846 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2015). The
Caterpillar court borrowed its analysis of work-product privilege from other courts. See, e.g., Mondis Tech. v
L.G. Elecs., Inc., 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE, 2:08-CV-478-TJW, 2011 WL 1714304, at *2 (E.D. Tex. May 4, 2011).
126 Jihyun Yoo, Protecting Confidential Information Disclosed to Alternative Litigation Finance Entities,
27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1005, 1012–13 (2014).
127 Id.
128 Rembrandt Techs., L.P. v. Harris Corp., No. 07C-09-059-JRS, 2009 WL 402332, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct.
Feb. 12, 2009).
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interest doctrine.129 For this court, the fact that the parties’ arrangement was in
regards to litigation meant a shared legal interest.130
Similarly, at least one court has held that the question of whether to apply
the common interest doctrine hinges on if the litigant and third party are engaged
in a shared enterprise and whether the legal advice (information) exchanged
relates to that enterprise.131
Seeing that these courts are more lenient than Caterpillar raises the question
of what is the best definition of a common legal interest. To answer this question,
this Comment proceeds by looking at how the common interest doctrine is
applied to both defendants exchanging privileged information with their insurers
and insurers exchanging privileged information with their re-insurers.
III. PRIVILEGE PROBLEMS FOR INSURERS AND RE-INSURERS
At first glance, insurers and re-insurers share many of the same
characteristics for defendants, as third-party litigation funders do for
plaintiffs.132 Both distribute risk. Both need to analyze privileged information to
better understand the merits of a litigant’s case.
Despite this apparent similarity between the two industries, courts apply the
common interest exemption differently for each of them. Generally, courts
readily permit the common interest doctrine as an exemption from normal
waiver rules when an insured defendant seeks to share privileged information
with its insurer (or when an insurer seeks to share privileged information with a
re-insurer).133 Conversely, as discussed earlier, courts tend to hold that the
common interest doctrine does not apply when plaintiffs share privileged
information with a third-party litigation funder.134

129

Id.
Id.
131 Fresenius Med. Care Holdings v. Roxane Labs., Inc., No. 2:05-cv-0889, 2007 WL 895059, at *1 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 21, 2007). This same court also recognized a 1996 Federal Circuit case, In re Regents of University
of California, 101 F.3d 1386, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1996), where the common interest doctrine was applied to enforce
patent rights. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, 2007 WL 895059, at *3. The court held that two parties sharing
exclusive patent rights had a common legal interest in enforcing their joint patent rights. Id. The court mentioned
the litigants had a common legal interest despite that their shared interest was primarily commercial. Id.
132 Symposium Panel, Third-Party Litigation Funding, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 257, 274 (2011) (discussing
the analogy between insurers and third-party funders).
133 See Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, 2007 WL 895059, at *2.
134 See Mondis Tech. v L.G. Elecs., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE, 2011 WL 1714304, at *4 (E.D. Tex.
May 4, 2011).
130
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This Comment proceeds by analyzing courts’ rationales for why insured
defendants can avail themselves of the common interest doctrine for privileged
information shared with their insurers. This analysis shows that courts’ rationale
for applying the common interest exemption to insurers and re-insurers could
also apply to third-party litigation funders.
A. Common Interest Doctrine for Insurers
In many insured–insurer cases addressing attorney–client privilege, courts
recognize insurers and insured as joint clients.135 One court has characterized
this relationship by saying that “confidential communications between either the
insurer or the insured and counsel are protected by the attorney–client privilege,
and both the insurer and insured are holders of the privilege.”136 Two immediate
differences exist between this type of interaction and the one between potential
plaintiffs and third-party litigation funders. First, the insurer is contractually
obligated to provide defense for the insured.137 The insured and insurer are
already involved with one another prior to the emergence of the lawsuit.
Conversely, third-party litigation funders only enter the scenario once a lawsuit
is pending.138 Second, the insurer is financially interested in the outcome of the
insured’s case just by the fact that the insured is being sued.139 The insured
cannot walk away from a claim it would rather not defend. This contrasts with
the third-party litigation funder who has no legal obligation to pursue a case it
does not like.140
These two distinctions suggest a rationale for why the tri-partite relationship
between insured, insurer, and attorney obtains attorney–client privilege for
confidential information shared amongst them but third-party litigation funders
are unable to avail themselves of attorney–client privilege. In these typical
insurer and insured relationships, the courts do not have to address the common

135 Grace M. Giesel, Alternative Litigation Finance and the Attorney–client Privilege, 92 DENV. U. L. REV.
95, 122 (2014); see, e.g., Bank of Am., N.A. v. Superior Court of Orange Cty., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 526, 541 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2013).
136 Bank of Am., N.A., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 531.
137 Giesel, supra note 135, at 122.
138 Charles Silver, Litigation Funding Versus Liability Insurance: What’s the Difference?, 63 DEPAUL L.
REV. 617, 621 (2014).
139 Id.
140 See Michelle Boardman, Insurers Defend and Third Parties Fund: A Comparison of Litigation
Participation, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 673, 680 (2012) (noting that the insurer’s involvement in litigation, unlike
a litigation funder’s involvement, “is automatic, not an investment choice”).
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interest question because both insurer and insured are understood as clients
having the same attorney, neither is a third party to which a disclosure is made.141
However, cases exist where the insured has separate counsel from the
insurer.142 The insurer’s role here is simply to fund the defense,143 much like a
third-party litigation funder would for a plaintiff. In Lectrolarm Custom Systems
v. Pelco Sales, the plaintiff sued the defendant for patent infringement.144 The
defendant shared information protected by attorney–client privilege with its
insurer.145 During discovery, the plaintiff sought out this shared information,
asserting that because the defendant disclosed the information to a third party,
the defendant waived privilege.146 The court invoked the common interest
exemption even though the insurer and the defendant each had its own
counsel.147
Moreover, the insurer had elected only to defend some of the defendant’s
claims.148 Yet, even though the insurer elected not to defend all the claims, this
issue was not dispositive. Rather, the court held that because the defendant and
the insurer undertook a “joint defense effort,” with at least some of the claims,
the insurer and defendant had a sufficient “commonality of interest” to prevent
disclosure from waiving attorney–client privilege.149
B. Common-Interest Doctrine for Re-Insurers
Additionally, many cases have examined whether insurers sharing
information protected by attorney–client privilege with re-insurers automatically
141

See Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, 2007 WL 895059, at *2.
Giesel, supra note 135, at 123.
143 Id.
144 Lectrolarm Custom Sys. Inc. v. Pelco Sales, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 567, 568 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
145 Id. at 568–70.
146 Id. at 569.
147 Id. at 572.
148 Id. at 571.
149 Id. at 572. While the court did not provide a comprehensive analysis of its own, it refers to several cases
all suggesting that parties engaged in a common legal enterprise satisfy the standard for the common interest
exemption. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989); Eisenberg v. Gagnon,
766 F.2d 770, 787 (3d Cir. 1985); Griffith v. Davis, 161 F.R.D. 687, 692 (C.D. Cal. 1995). But see First Pacific
Networks, Inc. v. Atl. Mut. Ins., 163 F.R.D. 574, 581–82 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that in a case between the
insured and the non-defending insurer, the non-defending insurer has no common interest in privileged
communications between insured and defending insurer). The Lectrolarm court distinguishes First Pacific
Networks arguing that although the non-defending insurer may have no common interest in communications
between the defending insurer and the insured, that does not imply that a defending insurer likewise does not
have common interest in communications between itself and the insured. Lectrolarm Custom Sys., Inc., 212
F.R.D. at 572–73.
142
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waive privilege by making such a disclosure. Generally in these types of cases,
insurers seek to invoke the common interest exemption to prevent the insured
from accessing the information shared with the re-insurer.150 These situations
are particularly analogous to third-party litigation funding because the reinsurers often do not offer any concrete legal strategy. Any common legal
interest these re-insurers have with the original insurer is based on sharing
liability concerns.
Courts have not uniformly analyzed cases where insurers try to invoke the
common interest exemption for information shared with re-insurers.151 Although
courts on both sides require that the party receiving privileged information and
the party giving information have sufficiently common interests to invoke the
exemption, the courts differ (much like as they did with the third-party litigation
funders) on how to define a sufficiently common interest.152
Great American Surplus Lines Ins. v. Ace Oil illustrates the approach of
recognizing that the common interest doctrine applies for re-insurers. In that
case, the court held that because an insurance agent’s disclosure of privileged
documents to a re-insurer was “reasonably necessary,” the disclosure did not
constitute waiver of privilege.153 The court argued that good business practices

150

1 DAVID M. GREENWALD, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 1:111 (3d ed. 2015).
Id. (collecting cases where courts have held, in the re-insurer context, that the common interest doctrine
prevented privilege waiver); see also, e.g., Great Am. Surplus Lines Ins. v. Ace Oil Co., 120 F.R.D. 533, 538
(E.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that the disclosure of documents by insurer to re-insurer did not constitute waiver of
privilege because the re-insurer, having a financial stake in the outcome of the suit, had a “need to know” the
shared information); Durham Indus. v. N. River Ins., No. 79 Civ. 1705, 1980 WL 112701, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
21, 1980) (“[W]here the reinsurers bear a percentage of liability on the bond, their interest is clearly identical to
that of [the defendant insurer].”); Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., No. 701223,
1991 WL 230742, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 1991) (holding that the interests of the insurer and re-insurer
were “inextricably linked by the reinsurance treaty” that imposed 7.5% share of any liability on the insurer).
For a list of cases where courts have held, in the re-insurer context, that the common interest exemption
does not apply, see Regence Grp. v. TIG Specialty Ins., No. 07-1337-HA, 2010 WL 476646, at *2–3 (D. Or.
Feb. 4, 2010) (ruling the insurer could not assert common legal interest over communications with re-insurer
when the two parties had previously engaged in contested arbitration with one another); Reliance Ins. v. Am.
Lintex Corp., No. 00 CIV 5568 WHP KNF, 2001 WL 604080, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2001) (rejecting insurer’s
argument that it shared a “unity of interest” with the re-insurer; while their commercial interests coincided, no
evidence demonstrated that the insurer and re-insurer shared the same counsel or coordinated legal strategy in
any way); Front Royal Ins. v. Gold Players, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 252, 258 (W.D. Va. 1999) (holding the common
interest doctrine does not apply to communications “created in the ordinary course of business under the
contractual obligations between insurer and reinsurer”).
152 Supra note 151.
153 Great Am. Surplus Lines Ins., 120 F.R.D. at 537; see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 912 (West 2015) (stating
disclosure does not waive privilege if it is “reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for
which the lawyer . . . was consulted . . . .”).
151
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dictate that a re-insurer would want to examine business documents from the
insurer, especially as they relate to shared liability.154 Consequently, the court
reasoned that recognizing such a disclosure as a waiver of privilege would be an
undue interference from the court.155
Other courts, as in Durham Industries v. North River Industries, Ins., have
similarly held that when a re-insurer shares a percentage of liability with the
insurer, the two parties have “clearly identical” interests.156 The Durham court
noted that the traditional common interest exemption test asks whether the two
parties have a sufficiently common legal interest regarding a privileged
communication that relates to legal advice.157 For the Durham court, sharing
liability between the re-insurer and the insurer constituted a sufficiently common
legal interest.158
On the other side, courts tend to not recognize the common interest
exemption for re-insurers when the privileged communications between insurer
and re-insurer are part of the ordinary course of business.159 The existence of an
insurer/re-insurer relationship does not in itself establish that the two parties
have sufficiently common interests because the parties could be antagonistic to
each other.160
Even the courts, in the re-insurer context, with the narrowest approach to the
common interest exemption define it as two parties “embodying a cooperative
and common enterprise towards an identical legal strategy.”161 None of the
courts go as far as to suggest that an identical legal strategy means that one party
to the privileged information must necessarily offer legal advice to the other.
The question for the courts asks whether the parties share the same legal interest
in terms of an end result, not whether one party shapes the other’s approach.

154

Great Am. Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 120 F.R.D. at 537.
Id. at 538.
156 Durham Indus., No. 79 Civ. 1705 (RWS), 1980 WL 112701, at *3.
157 Id.
158 Id. at *1–2.
159 Front Royal Ins. v. Gold Players, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 252, 257 (W.D. Va. 1999).
160 Reliance Ins. v. Am. Lintex Corp., No. 00 CIV 5568 WHP KNF, 2001 WL 604080, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
June 1, 2001); see also Regence Grp. v. TIG Specialty Ins., No. 07-1337-HA, 2010 WL 476646, at *2 (D. Or.
Feb. 4, 2010) (holding insurer and re-insurer do not have common interest when they had previously engaged in
contested arbitration).
161 Fireman’s Fund Ins. v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 284 F.R.D. 132, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting
Lugosch v. Congel, 219 F.R.D. 220, 237 (N.D.N.Y. 2003)); see also United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237,
243 (2d Cir. 1989) (inquiring whether “a joint defense effort or strategy has been decided upon and undertaken
by the parties and their respective counsel”).
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Consider Fireman’s Fund Ins. v. Great American Ins. Co. of New York,
where the court held that evidence of shared counsel or coordinated strategy
would be sufficient to find a common interest, but it is not necessary.162 The
Fireman’s Fund court ruled against applying the common interest doctrine
because the relationship of insurer/re-insurer alone (without other evidence
presented) did not per se establish sufficiently common interests.163 But the court
did signal that evidence of “a joint prosecution[,] . . . shared legal expenses, or
that one party exercised control over the conduct of the action” would indicate
a common legal interest.164
This approach is much less restrictive than how the courts apply the common
interest doctrine for third-party litigation funders.165 Moreover, it is consistent
with the underlying policy goal of attorney–client privilege, which is to
encourage effective rendering of counsel. Protecting shared information by
attorney–client privilege encourages the information to be shared. If a litigant
shares information with a re-insurer, the litigant is more readily able to afford
counsel. Affording counsel is a subset of effective rendering of counsel. Hence,
affording protection to information shared with a re-insurer fulfills the policy
goal of attorney–client privilege.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DISPARATE TREATMENT OF THE COMMON INTEREST
DOCTRINE
The first section of this Part analyzes courts’ different approaches to the
common interest doctrine. While courts narrowly apply the common interest
doctrine to third-party litigation funders, they apply the common interest
doctrine more broadly to insurers of defendants. The second section of this Part
argues that a broad common interest doctrine (as is applied to insurers of
defendants) should be similarly applied to third-party litigation funders. Doing
so would better effectuate the policy goal of attorney–client privilege.
A. Two Approaches to the Common Interest Doctrine
When courts decide whether the common interest doctrine applies, the crux
of their analysis focuses on whether the parties share a common legal interest.

162
163
164
165

284 F.R.D. at 140–41.
Id. at 141.
Id.
See supra Part II.
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While determining what constitutes a common legal interest appears
straightforward, courts waver in their definitions of the term “legal.”
Courts fall into one of two general categories: (1) courts that characterize a
common legal interest as having a shared interest in a legal outcome; and (2)
courts that characterize a common legal interest as actively coordinating a legal
strategy with one another.166
The plain meaning of legal is not so immediately clear that it is obvious
which of the two above categories has a better understanding. Similarly, the
dictionary definition of legal is not precise enough to point to which court
definition is more suitable.167
Consider the following hypotheticals:
Situation One: Client A, a potential plaintiff, gives document X, about the
merits of his potential claim, to his attorney B. Attorney B consciously discloses,
at the request of client A, document X to friend C who is a fiction writer
researching his next legal drama Y.
Regardless of what document X is about, when client A transmits document
X to his attorney B the communication becomes protected by attorney–client
privilege. When attorney B discloses document X to friend C, it is a disclosure
to a third party waiving attorney–client privilege. Client A cannot avail himself
of the common interest doctrine because friend C’s only concern is situation Y.
Friend C, although obviously interested in document X, has no common legal
interest in X. Friend C’s interest is no more than that of an observer.
The policy goal of attorney–client privilege is to encourage effective
rendering of counsel. As a disclosure of privileged material is made to a person
no way affiliated with the client’s legal issues, such a disclosure typifies the
classic example of an implied waiver of attorney–client privilege.
Situation Two: Client A, a potential defendant, gives document X, about the
merits of the potential claim, to his attorney B. Client A is insured by insurer C,
who is legally obligated to defend the claim. Attorney B transfers document X
to insurer C, so that insurer C can analyze the claim’s merits. Insurer C is not a

166

See supra Part III.
Legal, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=legal (last
visited Mar. 29, 2017).
167
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client of attorney B and retains its own independent counsel. Insurer C actively
coordinates defense strategy with client A.
Document X becomes protected by attorney–client privilege when client A
transfers it to attorney B. Attorney B’s transfer of document X to insurer C
constitutes disclosure of a privileged document to a third person. Such a
disclosure impliedly waives attorney–client privilege, unless client A and
insurer C can avail themselves of the common interest doctrine.
Here, client A and insurer C not only share liability concerns from the
potential outcome of the lawsuit, but they also actively plan their litigation
strategy together. All courts would readily hold that planning a joint defense
constitutes sharing a common legal interest. Sharing a common legal interest
means client A could use the common interest exemption to prevent waiver of
attorney–client privilege for case information disclosed to insurer C.
Situation Three: Defending insurer A transfers document X about the claim
it is defending to attorney B to inform its re-insurer C. Re-insurer C is providing
money to partially fund the defense. Defending insurer A and re-insurer C retain
their own independent counsels.
Document X becomes protected by attorney–client privilege when insurer A
transfers it to attorney B. Attorney B’s transfer of document X to re-insurer C
constitutes disclosure of a privileged document to a third person. Such a
disclosure impliedly waives attorney–client privilege, unless insurer A and reinsurer C can avail themselves of the common interest doctrine.
The business relationship between re-insurer C and insurer A does not by
itself evince a common legal interest. However, as re-insurer C is contributing
funds to insurer A to support the defense effort, they share an interest in the
outcome of the case. This shared liability, underscored by the funds contributed
toward a joint defense effort, constitutes a sufficiently common legal interest.
Most courts would hold that the parties may avail themselves of the common
interest doctrine.
Situation Four: Client A, a potential plaintiff, prepares document X
regarding the merits of his potential claim for person C. Client A transfers
document X to his attorney B. Attorney B then transfers the document to person
C. Person C is a potential third-party litigation funder for the claim. Person C
analyzes document X as a part of the due diligence process to determine whether
to invest in the lawsuit.
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Document X receives attorney–client privilege when client A transfers it to
attorney B. The disclosure to person C constitutes an implied waiver, unless
client A can avail himself of the common interest doctrine. The majority position
(as illustrated by Caterpillar) suggests that person C roots from the sideline
about the outcome of the lawsuit.168 Under this position, the “rooting for”
interest of the third-party litigation funder is not enough to constitute a
sufficiently common legal interest.169 To avail themselves of the common
interest exemption, the parties must actively plan litigation strategy together.170
From a meta-perspective, scenarios two and four illustrate the narrow
interpretation of the common interest exemption. As portrayals of the narrow
interpretation, scenario two shows where a party may avail itself of the common
interest exemption and scenario four shows where a party may not. In contrast,
scenario three illustrates the broader interpretation of the common interest
exemption.
As portrayals of the narrow interpretation, why do the insurer and defendant
in scenario two receive protection from the common interest doctrine but the
plaintiff and third-party litigation funder in scenario four do not? The insurer in
scenario two, in addition to providing funds for the defense, actively coordinates
the defense strategy with the defendant. This differs from the third-party
litigation funder in scenario four, whom only provides funds for the plaintiff
without any direct involvement coordinating legal strategy. Hence, while the
legal interest that the insurer in scenario two shares with the defendant is built
on more than just a financial outcome, the third-party-litigation funder’s only
involvement in the case is financial.
In contrast, in situation three, demonstrating the broader interpretation of the
common interest doctrine, the re-insurer has a sufficiently common legal interest
despite only providing funds to the insurer defending the case. Whereas not
actively coordinating legal strategy prevents the third-party litigation funder in
scenario four from using the common interest doctrine as a discovery shield, this
is not an impediment to the re-insurer in scenario three.
For a document to lose its protection from attorney–client privilege because
it actually reaches the place where it was intended to go defeats the goal of
attorney–client privilege (the goal of enabling clients to most effectively obtain
168
169
170

See Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 732 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
See id.
See id.
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legal counsel). The document is going to the place where it was originally
intended; a place that enables the lawsuit to take place.
Many risk averse plaintiffs may not be able to litigate costly claims, just as
many defendants cannot afford costly defenses. Third-party litigation funders
allow undercapitalized plaintiffs to proceed with their claim. Similarly, insurers
and re-insurers enable potential defendants to afford the expenses of a defense.
The third-party litigation funders have at least as much of a common interest in
the plaintiff’s claim as does a re-insurer contributing funds to a defending
insurer. Put in terms of their purposes:
Intuitively, insurers (and re-insurers) allow defendants to share the risk
inherent with any lawsuit. Third-party litigation funders allow plaintiffs to share
the risk inherent with any lawsuit.171
Hence, no obvious reason exists for why courts would treat insurers and reinsurers differently than third-party litigation funders when applying the
common interest doctrine. The last part of this Comment argues for a uniform
common interest doctrine.
B. A Uniform Common Interest Doctrine
This Comment relies on a policy argument to highlight why the broader
definition of common legal interest is preferable. As the common interest
doctrine operates as an exemption from the normal waiver rules of attorney–
client privilege,172 this Comment advances the notion that the best interpretation
of the common interest doctrine would further the policy goal of attorney–client
privilege. Essentially, a broad definition of common legal interest furthers the
goal of attorney–client privilege because it allows plaintiffs and defendants to
seek out funding for litigation while shielded from the fear of waiving privilege.
Discussed earlier in this Comment, attorney–client privilege developed to
encourage clients to openly speak with their attorney within the confines of
confidentiality.173 By encouraging these communications, clients can obtain the
most effective counsel.
An expansive common interest doctrine furthers this goal because in some
lawsuits the litigants cannot afford the cost of litigation. To pay these expenses,
171
172
173

Molot, supra note 26, at 73 (describing how funders permit plaintiffs to hedge their bet).
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
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of which a large portion is the cost of counsel, litigants may turn to a third party
to help fund the suit.174 In other words, the third party’s funding (whether that
be from an insurer, re-insurer, or third-party litigation funder) effectively renders
counsel for the litigant. A litigant that cannot pay for counsel likewise cannot
obtain counsel.
There is a fear that applying the common interest doctrine broadly, to protect
information shared with third party-litigation funders, leads to an overly
expansive attorney–client privilege. Although courts tend to want to construe
attorney–client privilege narrowly,175 the broader interpretation of the common
interest doctrine does not extend attorney–client privilege. As discussed
earlier,176 the common interest doctrine does not afford privilege to new classes
of documents or parties; rather, to even consider whether the common interest
doctrine applies to a disclosed document means that the document is already
protected by attorney–client privilege. Deciding the range of parties covered by
the common interest doctrine is entirely separate from discussing the breadth of
attorney–client privilege. Thus, this Comment’s advocacy for a broad common
interest doctrine does not run afoul of courts’ narrow construction of attorney–
client privilege.
This Comment proposes a common interest doctrine that recognizes parties
as having a common legal interest if they (1) share liability, (2) share a joint
interest in the outcome of litigation, or (3) actively coordinate legal strategy.
Doing so incentivizes litigants to explore all avenues of support as they
contemplate litigation.
CONCLUSION
The discovery process enables litigants to fairly assess all possible evidence
while building their case. As desirable as it is to permit wide-ranging discovery,
courts recognize various constraints on the process because of countervailing
policy concerns.
Work-product privilege and attorney–client privilege exemplify two of these
constraints. Their existence signifies courts’ respect for the role of counsel in the
judicial system. Just as a litigant cannot be compelled to divulge his or her inner

174
175
176

2014).

See supra note 24.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
See supra notes 38–39; see also Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 731 (N.D. Ill.
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speculation, courts recognize a litigant’s counsel as an extension of the litigant.
By protecting both confidential communications from the client to the attorney
(with attorney–client privilege) and an attorney’s legal theorizing in anticipation
of litigation (with work-product privilege), courts signal that every litigant
should have free reign to acquire the most effective counsel.
Of course, there can be too much of a good thing. And courts rightfully have
limited the extent of both privileges. For work-product privilege, disclosing
information that makes it more likely to fall into the hands of an adversary
indicates that the privilege holder lacks concern for keeping the information
confidential. Hence, courts treat such a disclosure as a waiver of work-product
privilege.
For attorney–client privilege, a disclosure of privileged information to any
third party indicates that the litigant did not intend to keep that information
confidential. Consequently, the purpose behind making the information
privileged no longer exists; courts recognize that such a disclosure indicates an
implied waiver of attorney–client privilege.
But such a broad waiver rule for attorney–client privilege does not account
for disclosures to a third party that share a legal interest with the privilege holder.
As the purpose of attorney–client privilege is to encourage clients to obtain the
most effective legal counsel, it would be inconsistent to waive the privilege
when a client makes a disclosure for the very purpose which attorney–client
privilege developed to encourage.
Recognizing this inconsistency, courts developed the common interest
doctrine to create an exemption from normal waiver rules for a disclosure of
privileged information made to a third-party sharing a common legal interest
with the privilege holder. Intuitive as such an exemption may be, courts waver
in their understandings of what constitutes a sufficiently common legal interest
to warrant applying the exemption.
Many courts, out of a fear of overly broadening the reach of attorney–client
privilege, have narrowly construed what constitutes a common legal interest. For
these courts, unless a third party actively coordinates litigation strategy with a
privilege holder, the common interest doctrine does not shield their disclosures
from waiver.
But these courts mistakenly treat the common interest doctrine as an
extension of attorney–client privilege. The common interest doctrine does not
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broaden the range of attorney–client privilege; rather, it only enters the
discussion once attorney–client privilege is already recognized.
Moreover, a broad interpretation of the common interest doctrine—one that
characterizes a common legal interest as loosely as a shared interest in a potential
legal outcome—furthers the policy goal of attorney–client privilege. Disclosures
made to third parties that provide funding to a litigant’s case should be exempted
from waiver. These third parties’ vested interest in the legal outcome of a case
is a sufficiently common legal interest because the third parties’ funding makes
a litigant more able to afford legal expenses.
Conceptually, the policy goal of attorney–client privilege, effective
rendering of counsel, is intertwined with the cost of legal expenses. Thus,
recognizing a broad common interest, one that shields disclosures made to third
parties contributing funds to lawsuits (whether those be insurers, re-insurers, or
third-party litigation funders), furthers the policy underlying attorney–client
privilege.
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